ONE thing that stands out about Malaysia in the studies of Comparative Politics is how durable its regime, if not form of politics, is.

In terms of governments that still allow for electoral competition (the extent to which such competition is fair, is another question), the Barisan Nasional  is probably the longest-ruling coalition government in the world.

The perennial paradigm

In terms of its politics, never mind the complexity of being a monarchical federation with a diverse populace, recent talks about a potential Malay tsunami, that happens at the back of a said Chinese tsunami, reveals how politics in this country is still largely framed in a Sino-Malay zero-sum logic.

To be clear, I don’t mean that the political divide is completely racial (or religious). Clearly, it is hardly so in real life. The intra-Malay Muslim split is self-evident from the fact there are now four major Malay parties (as well as the multiracial PKR) contesting for votes from the Malay electorate. Similarly, one cannot say that the Chinese community is prepared to give undivided support to the opposition, although as a minority, disagreements are understandably voiced less in communal terms.

But positions, such as with regards to contentious matters like Hudud, are still argued in terms that are either pro- and or-Malay (interchangeable with Muslim in the Malaysian context), the reverse of which is taken, explicitly or implicitly, as pro- or anti-Chinese.

Some might argue that the split is better articulated as an urban-rural split, but a closer examination will find that ethnoreligious chauvinist groups are largely urban-based and has argued their case in unmistakably modern, sophisticated, middle-class terms. This demonstrates that in a welter of class, geographical, and racial dynamics, it is such ascriptive identities that surface the best.

Even if one examines the evolution of Islamist politics in Malaysia, which at one point saw PAS branding Umno’s communal politics as assabiyah (tribalism), the race and religion distinction is less clear-cut today. As even seemingly mundane matters such as local elections were pegged in racial terms, and as religious leaders could blatantly make racial slurs, one begs the question if such a distinction is even necessary.

In other words, while it is true one may see developments that are outside of, and at points defies the perennial Sino-Malay antagonism, the paradigm remains the Archimedean point where Malaysian political life revolves around and will always come back to; a tragic realisation for those who once-believed Malaysia had phased into a kind of “new politics” after 2008.

That being said, things need not be necessarily bleak, as we still have one tsunami yet to happen. The youth tsunami.

The youthful and invisible

The case to be made here is not that there is a generational gap so large that the youths have completely escaped their parents’ racialist trappings; but reports have indicated that they might be less susceptible to communitarian politics (as do their peers abroad), giving the crucial room for politics to be steered towards other more pressing directions, such as bread and butter issues that tend to afflict them the most.

In any case, it is hard to tell how a youth tsunami will turn out to be because youth interest in politics (and by extension, voting) is very low, to begin with. It is reported that up to four million Malaysians, across all races and predominantly young, have not registered to vote.

Yet if this report is anything to go by, even youths in politics appear to have a different opinion than their elders. Recent feats of youth mobilisation – led by seniors to say the least –by Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders have also demonstrated that it takes a different ball-game altogether to inspire the youth to give their support (and that such support can be drawn out, contrary to the perception that the demographic is perpetually apathetic towards politics).

Considering that Malaysia is a significantly younger country, one can only imagine how transformational a youth tsunami can be.

Why is it only populism when it concerns the young?

In terms of strategy, we must also be careful about simplifying the aforementioned campaigns as populist, thinking that only unbridled benefits can rally the youths.

After all, isn’t what these figures were running against – which is arguably full of nativist, exclusivist vitriol – also populism itself?  And, pray tell, is any of the mainstream political discourse in Malaysia, from race-baiting using divine laws to clientelist disbursement of funds (sometimes in cash), not populist to begin with?

Perhaps it’s better to just admit that we have not captured the hearts and minds of our young ones yet and to start from scratch. Hopefully, there is still time for anyone who wants to try something different, radical even. – December 14, 2017.

* A Forensic Science-Asian Studies hybrid, Nicholas Chan is interested in how authority is shaped, exercised, and more importantly, resisted in Southeast Asia.

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.