NORTH Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in his assertion for pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons with a major shift of strategic deterrence to first use escalatory preventive tools, forms a new basis for him to disregard the overtures from the West and South Korea.

In strengthening Pyongyang’s nuclear tactical capabilities in the fastest time and with the threat to use it first hand if provoked, Kim desires to give a clear message and warning to Seoul in stopping its early counter-measures and precedence setting, with simultaneous messages to Washington that sanctions should and must be stopped along with joint military drills.

Additional capabilities continue to be strengthened by the theoretical ability to accommodate higher volumes of nuclear warheads in enabling the delivery of nuclear explosive power covering the entire continental United States, compared to geographical limitations in Alaska and Guam previously. While critics and analysts continue to be sceptical of the true capabilities of the Hwasong-17, Kim’s new strategy shifts the region’s counter-reactions to a new level of risk that will invite changes in the dynamics of the military spectrum. Nuclear brinkmanship is seen and touted as more effective in restraining the counter measures taken, at least the scale of them. Whether it is a worthy experiment or otherwise, it warrants a needed shot for Kim.

In other words, the old dogma and line of deterrence by the coalition no longer hold water, at least for Kim’s new awakening.  Past containing strategies are now being used by Kim against the three parties. Regional and global geopolitical twists remain centred on the supremacy of national strategic interests and security as well as national survival. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. The bigger enemy will force me to make a temporary alliance with my smaller enemy. This is seen in Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korea’s President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s desire to continue to forge closer ties and preparations to deal with Pyongyang in particular and Beijing in general, ready to cast aside historical tensions at least for now.

Pyongyang continues to shift the gear in its newfound momentum in pushing forward the capacity for its escalatory offensive deterrence. It might use the next nuclear test in claiming the ability to build smaller warheads that will be able to be fitted on larger missiles including the capacity for a multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). These solid fuelled smaller missiles, which will be easier to remain hidden and to be manoeuvred,will give further advantage to Pyongyang by making  them more difficult to be targets for pre-emptive destruction.  

The next step in further polishing Pyongyang’s nuclear fortitude and tactical capacity with the progress in launching methods from submarines and deepening ICBM capacity in the near future reflect Kim’s desire and strategy to move away from the cocoon of previous tools. The goals will be to outmatch and outrun its southern neighbour in particular in the impending arms race especially in ensuring that it remains the clear winner in the nuclear gap while at the same time forcing Washington to change its sanction-based deterrence and archaic dependency of ties with Seoul as the main framework of negotiating from the position of strength.

While he calculates that he can still rely on Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, he is also observant of the fact that he is increasingly being used as an effective tool in their own strategic and calculated peripheries in their dealings with the West. Xi is increasingly pressured to play his greater part in reining in Kim and has had enough problems with Ukraine and Russia being used as the battering ram in further cornering his options and expectations. He would not want a further dilemma and worse, an irrefutable excuse for the West to increase its foothold and justification in bringing the entire military might to its doorstep as a result of Kim’s erratic moves.

Kim wants to be different and to stem his own legacy in aiming for a final peaceful breakthrough, but he realises that he needs Western nodding in giving him the face-saving transition and the last say to portray to the nation that Washington somehow acknowledges the wisdom and strength of the Kim regime in coming to this compromise and peaceful conflict resolution. 

In this regard, Kim believes he has time on his side unlike China’s Xi, with his youth and ruthless displacement of others who challenge him and an unhindered free hand in dictating policies with the support of his handy elites led by his sister Yo-Jong. The long game is his to lose, and along the way, outlines further goals to bolster his military capacities particularly in enhancing the accuracy and range of his missiles and also targeting next frontiers with the likes of nuclear submarines and multiple warhead capacity of his ICBMs.

The reality at hand does not seem to be rosy as in Kim’s projection, however. He faces both internal and external squeezes with the full-blown impact from climate challenges and a strengthened alliance of democracies and the Western order in threatening to upend internal food security and external survival. With rising inflationary pressure across the world and the squeeze in food sustainability and security, the reverberations and long term impact will not escape the periphery of North Korea, no matter how isolated it claims to be.  As time drags on, there is only so much Pyongyang can prepare for the long ball game of withstanding the natural chain effects of the non-traditional threats that will persistently pose problems for his populations more than him personally.

There is also only so much momentum and progress that he could caulk up in sustaining an effective and trusted first strike capacities and at the same time stalling the second-strike readiness and capabilities in leaving them vulnerable to first strike counter measures from Washington or even Seoul. This will render Pyongyang’s nuclear deterrence and its long held first strike threat to be less lethal and more obsolete, giving greater space for the West to act further. The prospects of deterrence and MAD (mutually assured destructions) will also greatly diminish in the long run as Washington develops a better and more holistic interceptive capacity with its unrivalled technological and military advancement which will provide better first strike prevention and an enhanced second-strike impact that will render Pyongyang’s past mechanism to futility. This signals that time certainly is not on the side with Jong-un and that the window for greater dialogue, engagement and diplomacy is fast closing in terms that will be beneficial for him in the long run.

The next nuclear test is only a matter of when, not if. The rationale for such a move, at least in Kim’s view, warrants the subsequent international condemnation and sanctions and further narrowing the path for conciliatory dialogue and openings. Like Putin, he has long tasted Western sanctions and retaliatory responses with seemingly little detrimental and hindering effects.

Moving forward, Kim will stick to his strategy and desire in playing the dual game of bolstering his nuclear progression while ensuring internal economic resilience and growth, with no clear signs he will pivot away from his nuclear baggage which still forms his biggest insurance and guarantee for his internal and external survival.  

He can still count on Xi and Putin for now, but as the cost-benefit fulcrum increasingly tilts towards jettisoning Pyongyang for their own national needs and survival and coupled with the inescapable multi-pronged challenges to his nation’s survival, he might recalibrate his strategic manoeuvres and to grab the opening for a stunning transformation twist which will stem his legacy in a different realm. Or he might be tempted to remain defiant and to stay on to the last straw of MAD. The rest of the world certainly roots for the former. Only time will tell. – May 4, 2022.
 
* Collins Chong Yew Keat reads The Malaysian Insight.

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.