IN her September 28 article in The Star, “The danger of being neutral,” Mergawati Zulfakar erred badly. 

She focused on one word – neutrality – without understanding how the original proponents had used, and even expanded, the concept across the dictate of the state and the region. 

In fact, various states and regions have adopted neutrality before. Many seem to like it, which is why the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) is alive and kicking, despite the end of the Cold War in 1989. 

There are many conflicts among the great powers, which are not worth getting into at all; which have spawned variations of neutrality. 

Switzerland’s concept of neutrality, for instance, had saved it from the ravages of World War II in 1939-1945 in Europe. Today, Switzerland continues to abide by it. 

Attracted by the yield of neutrality, the first Asian country to become interested in neutrality appears to be Burma.

It tried to stay neutral in the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, in order not to be dragged into it.

The United Kingdom also convened a conference in 1962 to help the “neutralisation,” of Laos, so that it was not a pawn of the Cold War, which was raging then in Indochina. 

The conference failed, and as the research of Joshua Kurtlanzick at Council for Foreign Relations in New York City showed, the United States poured close to US$300 billion (RM1.2 trillion) in today’s currency into Laos. What happened to Laos? It didn’t stay true to neutrality, and ended up as a pawn in the Vietnam War.

India has also invoked neutrality, which in in line with its belief in NAM. Once again, despite all the talks of India becoming a part of the “Quads” that included the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, invariably to constrain the growth of China, there remain Indian high officials in New Delhi who are firm believers in neutrality.

If one cares to check the hansard of  parliament in 1968, the Malaysian legislature has early records of the importance of neutrality too, according to Professor Yoneji Kuroyanagi, the doyen of Asean studies in Japan.

Here, unlike in other countries, Tun Razak pushed neutrality into a regional template, despite a myriad  of interpretations of what neutrality, neutralisation and neutralism mean. Under Tun Razak, it became the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, or ZOPFAN, in 1971. 

Each member state can have its own interpretation, though, ideally, the key is to keep great powers from transforming Southeast Asia into the “cockpit of great power rivalry.”

Research by John Funston, at Australian National University, argues that neutrality can mean non intervention in two forms: a member state shall not support the opposition of another member state; nor oppose the military alliance of another member state in Asean too.

As long as member states of Asean agree on these two planks, Asean regionalism can indeed be another form of neutrality too. Neutrality is, therefore, a very strategic and fluid concept.

With these two principles in place, neutrality and non-intervention do not mean that Malaysia does not care about South China Sea or regional affairs – as Mergawati misunderstood –only that Malaysia will not side with any military power that keeps bringing in ever bigger and more lethal battleships into South China Sea and the surrounding waters of Asean.

So why did Mergawati produce copy in The Star that warned of the “danger” of neutrality ? The answer lies in her confusing neutrality with indifference and insouciance. Neutrality is furthest removed from apathy. Mergawati allowed the two words to collapse into one, leading to her own confusion and in turn, a headline that no doubt confused many readers too.

Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad had said as early as June 2018, in an interview with South China Morning in Hong Kong, that there are “certain islands,” in South China Sea which Malaysia claims to be within our sovereign rights – especially as they lie within the 200 nautical miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Malaysia – to which Malaysia cannot remain indifferent to at all.

They belong to Malaysia, to which Putrajaya cannot be oblivious. Mergawati must have overlooked the importance of this interview.

In fact, in her article, she ended up praising the statement released by US Defence Secretary of State James Mattis. Isn’t that an odd way to warn of the danger that Malaysia must confront, only to tell the defence minister and his ministry to learn from the US ?

Thus, despite the clarification from Dr Mahathir, Mergawati was still stirred by a press statement from the Defence Ministry on September 25t, especially after the minister Mohamad Sabu met with his US counterpart Mattis in New York. 

In that statement, the Defence Ministry affirms the importance of “neutrality” on issues concerning the South China Sea. That does not mean foregoing the territorial sovereignty of the issue. 

It means when two or more great powers fight over the 3.6 million sq km of the South China Sea, Malaysia will be protective of its own interest while concurrently urging all sides to emphasise the importance of diplomacy and dialogues per what Mahathir Doctrine has suggested.

Neutrality also implies belief in the process of neutralisation, where great powers are asked not resort to provocative behaviour, invariably, of flexing their military muscles at sea, or, in the waters, indeed, even in the air. 

In other words, Mat Sabu is trying to implement the Mahathir doctrine, so that no battleships will anchor and linger in the areas, or, perform any dangerous submarine or aerial manoeuvres.

Neutrality does not mean throwing all cautions to the importance of South China Sea or the East China Sea for that matter. Indeed, if one goes through the logbook of Mat Sabu’s trips, one can see that he has engaged the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), Asean Defence Plus Meetings and signed a memorandum of understanding with Japan on the importance of working together on building a stronger regional peacekeeping centre in Port Dickson, to which Tokyo has donated US$1 million, mutual humanitarian assistance, and further collaboration with the Philippines Armed Forces to counter the threats of kidnapping for ransom groups that have often spilled over into Sabah. 

A neutral country that is static is motionless and inert. But this is not Malaysia’s concept of neutrality. If anything, it is dynamic, guided by the concept of regional confidence building, Asean’s preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and maritime cooperation, all of which had been agreed on at the Asean Regional Forum and Asean Defence Plus Ministers Meetings. 

Journalists and civil servants who were generously, albeit anonymously quoted in the report of Mergawati, should be reminded that the new policy involves pro-active interpretation and fresh understanding of Malaysian foreign policy history, especially in relation to how neutrality, neutralisation and neutralism were and still are gainfully deployed by various countries in Europe and Asia Pacific. –  September 29, 2018.

* Phar Kim Beng was the first Cambridge Commonwealth Scholar to work on Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy. He has published in Harvard International Review and Harvard Asia Quarterly, the latter earning him the best Graduate Essay Award in Harvard.

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.