HAVING finally ordered a full lockdown despite ruling out the possibility just a few days prior, the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government seems to have bowed to demands that it takes the pandemic more seriously. Yet for many the move is already too little, too late.

After a series of missteps, flip-flops, and elitist displays of insensitivity, going “all in” now with a lockdown will do little to to appease the rakyat who are all out of patience.

This essay is not a dissection of the government’s performance and what it has done wrong or right. There are many moving parts to the question that need to be addressed. It’s safe to say that there’s no one way to deal with the pandemic, and that science has limits in informing policy options. Plus, context and setting make require more than a textbook answer.

However, the government’s constant missteps and uncanny ability to invite the anger of almost all sections of the populace in a way that has transcended the polarity that was induced during Pakatan Harapan (PH) days deserve a deeper look. To be sure, I am not dismissing the leadership, (in)competence, and a feudal political system struggling to adjust to a new reality where all rules are to be applied equally as factors to PN’s dismal performance.

Yet I believe a fundamental issue has hampered the government’s response to the Covid situation, especially since the uptick in late 2020. That outbreak never quite subsided, and peaks were observed during Chinese New Year and the Raya seasons.

That issue is that of an identity crisis, in that PN struggles between wanting to be a crisis, a popular or a populist government. It switches between these roles too rapidly and often thoughtlessly, sending mixed messages to the people as to how the pandemic should be viewed.

In instituting an emergency while acting indecisively, as seen in the many revisions to the standard operating procedure to pander to too many interests and voices, the government appears to want to accumulate power and popularity at the same time, not knowing that both objectives don’t necessarily meet in a crisis.

As a result, in the eyes of the rakyat, they are none of those things: not reacting in a seriousness that befits a crisis government, not popular for failing to keep the cases down, and certainly not populist in the “pro-marhaen” sense.

Three types of government in a pandemic

Let’s back up a little and discuss what I mean by three types of government in the context of a pandemic.

By crisis government, I refer to governments such as ours that have suspended politics and seized centralised power in the name of dealing with the pandemic. A crisis government governs in a way that is outwardly sombre and stern, operating almost on a “whatever it takes” basis.

Leaders often take on a paternalistic role, with communications flowing unilaterally (I say, you listen). China comes to mind as a classic and extreme example, though being in crisis mode and being successful are two very different things, as we shall see.

A popular government can be achieved in two ways: (i) getting the desired results and doing the right things, such as governing in a way that is empathetic, open to communications, having a general sense of responsibility and foresight and/or (ii) having a popular leader that exhibits those qualities. The best example is Jacinda Ardern’s government in New Zealand, which delivers on both ends: results and charismatic leadership.

Nonetheless, a popular government does not always have to deliver stellar results, as data has shown that Covid numbers do not really map onto a government’s popularity. In fact, Donald Trump’s substantial vote base in America does not seem to care that their country is suffering from the ignominy of having the most Covid-related deaths worldwide thus far.

But the Trump administration is hardly a popular government, which leads me to my third typology: a populist government. A populist government is one that subsumes the pandemic situation into its “people” v “corrupted elites”/”insiders” vs “outsiders” framing, which often led to more racism, xenophobia, and conspiracy theories.

Most bafflingly, as a result of such framings, populist governments, such as the Trump administration or Brazil’s Bolsonaro, consciously acted as if they were not in a crisis. Their leaders ridiculed mask-wearers, actively opposed lockdowns, and has even tried to discredit the scientists as if they were part of an effort to subvert the government.

Governments like these usually enjoyed substantial, though not necessarily majority support. Having turned the pandemic into a culture war, these administrations drew support not by addressing the pandemic but by showing their fanbase that they are protecting them from something more threatening: liberals, Jews, Communists, or whatever Bogeyman they conjure.

These categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, having successfully contained the pandemic through crisis measures, the Chinese government is also a popular government, as far as popularity can be assessed in non-democracies, that is.

The UK government drifted through the pandemic by switching modes from trying to be popular through generous wage subsidies, and even paying people to eat out at one point, to a crisis government that announced a lockdown in January 2021 and has withstood public pressure to loosen the restrictions until recently.

Identity crisis

Having suspended Parliament since the beginning of the year, the PN government is, first and foremost, a crisis government. But the problem is that it does not act like one. At times it acts like it wants to be popular before even delivering the results. Clearly, some of its leaders tried very hard to be popular.

I would postulate that this identity crisis stems from two reasons. First, the ruling parties’ insecurity about their legitimacy, being a government that came into power not through the ballot box. Second, it could be because this wave of Covid cases is linked to the Sabah elections. Knowing that they were somewhat responsible for the spread yet not able to apologise for it, politicians are overly eager to redeem themselves. Either way, these insecurities reshuffle priorities: gaining popularity at times seem to precede that of tackling the pandemic.

If a government oscillates too much between being a crisis and a popular government, it is most likely to come out as soft and indecisive. It’s a bit like how the more some people try to be popular, the more socially awkward they look.

Just look at how SOPs kept changing during the festivities, which is most likely the result of the government trying to maintain popularity by appearing to be considerate to the constituents, often at the dire cost of disease control.

Yet, decisions made based on popularity considerations do not convey the gravity of the situation, which results in lax compliance, forcing the government to backtrack and tighten its regulations later as cases rise, angering even more quarters who have made their planning based on previous versions of the SOPs.

Whereas it may have tried to cultivate it during the early days of the pandemic through anti-migrant raids, the PN government has lost its populist credentials too. It is incredibly difficult to justify being a populist government when your fiscal spending in response to Covid is among the smallest in Asean; and when VIPs seemed to enjoy special treatment even as they violate the rules. Tellingly, even the once-popular, albeit fictional, Mak Cik Kiah is forgotten in government speeches these days.

With the wealthy, powerful, and well-connected seemingly getting away with flaunting rules, this also pushes the government, which is deeply insecure about its popularity, to compensate by being more lenient towards ordinary folks. Expectedly, cases skyrocketed, further tarnishing the government’s popularity.

With case numbers rising and the government revising regulations on a last-minute basis, the perception is simply that this government does not know what it is doing. That reinforces the perception the government merely wanted power for power’s sake. That erodes the legitimacy of the government even more, sending the nation into a downward spiral in terms of government legitimacy and public compliance.

As the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. If one already took on the mantle of a crisis government, the people will rightly expect that the pandemic be dealt with like a crisis.

But the identity crisis faced by the PN government makes them unable to decide or deliver like a crisis government. Deciding and delivering is made more difficult as the leadership is currently held hostage by the fact that they preside over a house of cards, thus having to appoint people to executive positions for their allegiance and not competence.

In crisis situations, the bargain offered to the people is usually between accountability, competency, and dignity. A crisis government promises competency at the expense of accountability. A popular government offers accountability to compensate for some lack in competency. A populist government offers dignity as the cover while it ditches accountability and competency. Yet, with all the indecisiveness, special treatment, and lack of effective communication, ordinary Malaysians seem to have gotten a package that delivers none of the above.

As long as the government does not have an answer to what it is, hashtags and memes will remind the government it is what the rakyat think it is. – June 1, 2021.

* A Forensic Science-Asian Studies hybrid, Nicholas Chan is interested in how authority is shaped, exercised, and more importantly, resisted in Southeast Asia.