SOME would argue that the oldest Islamist party in Malaysia emerged as one of the biggest winners by supporting Bersatu president Muhyiddin Yassin as prime minister. While it is debatable that he is PAS’ ideal pick, the party’s – and Barisan Nasional’s – primary objective is to have a federal government in which DAP and Anwar Ibrahim play no part.

With the support of Muafakat Nasional, Perikatan Nasional was formed, with PAS as the third-largest party (18 MPs) in the coalition. I posit that PAS being a junior partner is not without political costs; it will severely undermine the party’s ability to govern and electoral prospects.

“Coalition politics” is loosely defined as different parties cooperating to create a functional and stable government. This usually involves parties within the coalition working with – and sometimes against – each other by either compromising or conspiring to reduce one another’s dominance.

Governance by a coalition can also be costly as parties are unable to single-handedly decide policies. Instead, policymaking in a coalition is the outcome of compromise and bargaining among partners, in which the senior one typically dominates. Joining a coalition cabinet as a junior partner comes with the benefits of executive office, but this does not guarantee that the party will have its preferred policies implemented.

As a junior partner, PAS should be concerned about its ability to govern as part of a coalition while ensuring its policies are implemented. It’s easy for the party to unite with Bersatu and BN against a common threat, but hard for unnatural bedfellows to govern as partners. And though they are all Malay-based parties, PAS’ ideology and policy direction are considered minor compared to Umno and Bersatu’s. Bersatu, whose members comprise mostly Umno defectors, certainly has more in common with the BN lynchpin, and this could put PAS between a rock and a hard place.

PAS could either compromise, which would hurt it electorally, or rebel against its own government. The former would see the party risk losing its distinctiveness and being viewed as a poodle to Umno or Bersatu, while rebelling would have it return to the opposition wilderness.

There are already signs of PAS toning down its stance, such as when it proclaimed that RUU355, or the push to amend the Shariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, is not a priority. Similarly, the party ran on a platform calling for the abolition of the goods and services tax in the last elections, but the prime minister is now considering reinstating it.

Muhyiddin being chosen as prime minister when his party does not have the most parliamentarians within the ragtag PN disrupts the way a standard coalition government works. There are now two senior partners in PN competing for control of the government, which will further reduce PAS’ role in the coalition. The major portfolios are held by either Bersatu or Umno, with PAS given a measly three ministerial posts. Muhyiddin’s first act as prime minister was to strike a delicate balance in the cabinet by rewarding posts to his own party apparatchiks and PKR defectors while making enough appointments to satiate BN. The competition between Umno and Bersatu will only isolate PAS, reducing it to playing a bit part both in the coalition and cabinet.

Junior partners also get less media attention, and voters tend to associate a coalition government with the senior party. Keen observers of Malaysian politics would’ve already noticed a pattern: news on PN is mainly about the political tussle between Umno and Bersatu. Less attention is paid to PAS, whose political influence has waned from when it was in the opposition.

There is also the problem of junior partners’ tendency to underperform in elections after joining the government. This is because, among others, they cannot fulfil many of their promises to constituents or sufficiently differentiate themselves from their larger coalition partners. The results of the 1974 general election should serve to remind PAS that support for the party in Terengganu and Kelantan eroded after it joined BN. Even if PAS retains these states in the next elections, the party can no longer claim that it has total control over them as it is now expected to share power with Bersatu and Umno. PAS will no longer be in a position to dominate Kelantan, which it has ruled since 1990.

Also, the party has the least federal experience among its coalition partners – including Gabungan Parti Sarawak, which has thrown its support behind PN. This suggests that PAS will further concede ground in policymaking to its more experienced partners. There is also the problem of seat allocation, as PN has three Malay parties that are competitive in similar constituencies. PAS, by virtue of being the smallest of the three in terms of the number of MPs, is likely to concede more if PN survives till the next elections.

Overall, PAS’ fate in the coalition will likely be determined by how much it is willing to compromise without disappointing its ardent supporters, while hoping that its senior partners won’t be too domineering. And, the odds are that PAS will be dragged into a political quagmire if the bickering between Bersatu and Umno escalates.

It is safe to say PAS’ future in the government remains as shaky and capricious as politics in Malaysia. – March 17, 2020.

* Kenneth Cheng has always been interested in the interplay between human rights and government but more importantly he is a father of two cats, Tangyuan and Toufu. When he is not attending to his feline matters, he is most likely reading books about politics and human rights or playing video games. He is a firm believer in the dictum “power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will”.

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.