IT’S no wonder that many were let down by the cries of “Malaysia Baru” after the watershed May 9, 2018 elections. Apart from a new government, nobody knew what is, or what can be, new.

The thing about changing a government democratically is that the new path has to be forged democratically. But Malaysians have practically zero consensus on what is the path forward, other than that of the consensus held before. That pact conveniently called the social contract, with many parts of it conveniently “forgotten” by those who referred to it the most to intimidate others.

And even that was systematically eroded by chauvinistic ideologies, weakened state institutions, massive corruption and authoritarian rule for long periods by a one-party state.

If the fact of the matter is that a large number of Malaysians wanted a new deal, then a narrative of “Malaysia Baru” will have to be articulated by the government.

Saying is easier than actually doing it, of course, given the tensions between many visions of nation- and statehood circulating. For example, between a cultural-linguistically Malay-Muslim and a plural one; or that between a centralised federation and a decentralised one; or, between one which keeps the current, largely secular ethos and one that adheres closer to Islamic jurisprudence and values.

This makes many narratives – other than Wawasan 2020, which has remarkable staying power – fall flat and end up being extremely pricey PR campaigns.

But today, I am going to talk about another tension that is less acknowledged. One between our will to forge our own path and identity in complete autonomy, and the harsh global political and economic environment we have no choice but to operate and excel in.

While not as emotive as the tensions described above, as they are not trapped in zero-sum logic, the tussle between prioritising nation-building and international competitiveness is always there.

You can see that in the diagnosis of our social and economic maladies, with some saying we are not successful because our nation-building failed, and others claiming it is because of such unproductive ventures that we got side-tracked from our pursuit of more realistic goals.

In hopes of being forgiven for oversimplification, I shall label proponents of the former and the latter as “romantics” and “pragmatists”, respectively.

The romantics stress the need for resolutions on issues of language, identity and culture because, to them, there is no national excellence without a clear conception of what the “nation” resembles. The pragmatists, on the other hand, tend to dismiss such issues as trivial because, to them, what’s the point of achieving any unity if we are united by poverty, ignorance and global irrelevance?

Both sides have their points. If we use the highly incendiary debate over matriculation recently, it is obvious nation-building goals were placed above pragmatic goals, because asking our students to go through a “back door” with lower demands of educational excellence means we place the issue of educational outcomes on the back-burner for goals of national integration.

The issue here is not even about quotas, but that of insecurity towards interethnic inequality – some of it perceived, some of it real, because the issue is more complex than what Facebook discourse or simplistic polls can ever tell us – that may again lead to communal tensions and even violence, with the May 1998 riots in Indonesia giving us the best cautionary tale.

The compromise is that we will manage the social and economic consequences of an education system that encourages less rigour as long as more Bumiputera students gain entry into public universities.

But in a hostile global economic environment with radical transformation impending for the job market, lowering educational standards would mean the kind of grievances the government tries to prevent may resurface again as youth unemployment surges, as seen in the case of the Arab Spring.

And, such surges will always take identitarian forms, even if the substratum is primarily economics. The pragmatists’ discourse is not alien to many of us, too. The key line of reasoning is that if the issues of culture and language are fundamentally intractable, and unity is nothing but a pipe dream, we might as well just pursue quality instead of haggling over contentious issues that leave us no better from where we started. And here is where one inserts the all-too-familiar vocabulary of good governance, meritocracy and technocracy.

But anyone who pays close attention to history and global development would know that there is much fallacy to such thinking. Supposedly value-neutral ideologies, like meritocracy and technocracy, are not without prejudices and biases. After all, such neoliberal ideas are those guiding our drive towards widening inequality, environmental collapse, as well as financial crisis after financial crisis.

During colonisation, good governance was basically what the colonial masters sold, underpinning the exploitation, subjugation and social trauma that ensued.

Also, the nation as a polity surrounded by geopolitical contingencies and populated by people with diverse interests, strengths and history is the least qualified candidate for high-stakes competition. After all, the ontology of the nation-state is based on a sense of belonging and protection, not one of a race car that is geared towards speed and winning.

The irony is that if the pragmatists can give more thought to nation-building, then the grievances caused by competition-centric policies can be better contained. The resulting inequities, whether temporary or long-term, can be better rationalised if they are for the good of the “nation” and its “people”, provided that the idea of the nation and who constitutes the “people” is articulated clearly and well-received, the job of nation-building, that is.

There is no space or intention here to provide a narrative on what “Malaysia Baru” can be. The important point is, whatever that narrative might be, the tensions between the romantics and the pragmatists will have to be reconciled without each side speaking past each other.

Such reconciliation is not impossible. Dr Mahathir Mohamad had attempted it once with the Look East Policy, albeit with limited success. But the fact that Japan’s sense of pride, purpose and identity as a nation work hand in hand with its well-acclaimed success in global competitiveness and innovation is undeniable.

As we brainstorm (and we have to, fast), ideas from the absurd (i.e. flying cars) to the grounded (i.e. shared prosperity) will have to be measured in terms that are sensical globally and inclusive locally, so that we don’t revel in the “syiok sendiri” syndrome, or be oblivious of the social costs of certain policies. Like it or not, “Malaysia Baru” can’t be made in circumstances of our own choosing, but we can make the best out of it if we know what those circumstances are, as romantics and pragmatists. – May 24, 2019.

* A Forensic Science-Asian Studies hybrid, Nicholas Chan is interested in how authority is shaped, exercised, and more importantly, resisted in Southeast Asia.

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.