RECUSING a judge is not to be made lightly. 

The following passage acts as an apt reminder from the judgment of Federal Court judge Abdul Hamid Mohamad in Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor 2006.

“Considering all the circumstances of the case, viewed objectively, is there a real danger of bias on the part of the learned judge if (he or she] were to continue to try the suit? Each case is to be decided on its own facts and the court should be vigilant not to allow parties to do ‘judge-shopping’ by recusal of judges.” 

A reminder to counsels is the following passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in England in Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim & Ors 1993.

“Just as an inference of apparent bias is not to be lightly drawn, so such a charge is not to be lightly made. That remains true even where, as here, any suggestion of actual bias is expressly disclaimed.”

“Cases may unhappily arise in which evidence of bias or apparent bias is so clear that an application for the discharge or removal of a judge is justified. But such an application is never justified simply by the instructions of the client.”

“Counsel’s duty to the court and to the wider interests of justice in our judgment requires that he should not lend himself to making such an application unless he is conscientiously satisfied that there is material upon which he can properly do so.” – September 1, 2022.

Hafiz Hassan reads The Malaysian Insight

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.