CHINA-TAIWAN relations are poised to determine the outcome of future power parity in the region and the prospects of greater all-out conflict taking place.

Beijing’s increased number of incursions has again highlighted the enormous stakes at play, in cementing the importance of both players to one another for both geopolitical and economic reasons. The climate over the past two decades at least, has shifted from initial wariness to one that is increasingly in pivot to mainland China’s sphere of dominance and grip. Left with no viable option but to give priority to the overwhelming dependence on Beijing and the fear of upsetting it by changing the conventional dogma of cross-strait ties, Taipei is left with increased vulnerabilities and its hands tied over the larger picture of long-term national interests and survival. This has been the case before the current administration’s clear stance on its future path on Taiwan, which has solicited the scramble for responses from Beijing in making clear its displeasure.

Beijing sees no other credible option but to project a strong message that any further actions from Taipei that are deemed challenging the entrenched order will be met with no-nonsense countermeasures that are two-pronged in nature. Firstly, it is to prevent the pursuit of any change to the current order and secondly, to send a firm deterring message to future governing parties and to the West that the Taiwan issue remains off-limits to the West’s strategic containment playbook.

Regardless of any change to the “strategic ambiguity” approach taken either by Taipei or Washington, this remains the ultimate red line by Beijing to deny Washington’s ambition of using Taipei as the leverage and greater card in its chess move on reorienting future power parity in the region.

Increasingly, openings for greater chips and cards in future peaceful embrace of closer cross-strait ties and in negotiations over deeper Track 1 diplomacy have been limited by the dominant sway held against the say of the general Taiwanese populace, especially the new demographic groups that have made their stance clear on their affiliation. This has been worsened by the sealed outcome of Beijing’s policy in containing Taipei, with near total pivot to an antagonising and bellicose stance in dealing with the current administration’s orientation.

The tightened grip of the Chinese Communist Party in local Taiwanese affairs, especially in the influence of local elections and swaying of the sentiments of the masses, have fundamentally changed the landscape Taiwan’s orientation with higher stakes involved in its political independence. Increasing depth of espionage in various forms including cyber infiltration of critical sectors have posed greater challenges for Taipei to confront in juggling between taking a firmer stance and playing second fiddle to avoid upsetting the apple cart.

The larger aim of revitalising the Chinese Dream (of becoming a fully developed nation by 2049) through the hundred-year marathon has produced strategic chess moves from the Belt and Road Initiative to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a larger aim of controlling the South China Sea with this regard in mind. The ultimate dream of having Taiwan reunite with the mainland has also projected greater assertive measures and chain impact in the region and beyond, including the Pacific and the greater Indo-Pacific sphere.

The spectrum of competition and relations with Beijing remains structural, systemic and value-driven where individual influence and affiliations matter less. Beijing’s no-holds-barred impetus and drive in narrowing the existing power gap with an all-out approach while simultaneously enhancing its foothold in the Indo-Pacific, are banked on as the new major fuel by Washington in justifying its renewed containment measures in the region.

Beijing has wisely used the opportunities and guarantees provided by the United States in maintaining this global system that allows peaceful access and progress of trade that has fuelled China’s meteoric rise.

Regional players have tried to maintain their centrality and avoid the lines of conflict between Washington and Beijing but to no avail. They remain rightly fearful and wary of the increasing acts of impunity in the region by the Chinese which violate the rules-based order and threaten territorial integrity and national sovereignty. A scramble for assurances of counterbalance measures from the West – especially Washington – has been initiated with great urgency. However, more strong-handed measures on official capacities are not able to be executed, in maintaining the necessary ties and in avoiding any reprisals from Beijing. This meticulous, yet risky and unsustainable approach has been the thrust of the regional orientation for years – and this sorely needs a strategic and future-proof revamp.

Policies of deliberate ambiguity have been in practice for decades, often at the expense of the region’s collective national interests. A clear, strategic and strong stance should be the new norm, with strategic clarity of vision and conviction in tossing aside the entrenched reliance on Beijing. A new dependence with foresight on future great players that are both dependable and mature in universal norms adoption must remain the path forward, where Washington and the West are projected to be the most credible and dependable players in this aspect, notwithstanding their past systemic shortcomings.

The dramatic transformation in China’s modernisation in the military field, mastery of futuristic technology and world economy, and dominance in innovation draw both awe and anxiety, but Washington remains confident in its existing and future advantages in braving challenges.

For this decade where the risks of an all-out high intensity conflict over Taiwan remain the highest, the prospects of the move by Beijing rest on three key parameters. Firstly, the level of deterrence impact and the credibility of comprehensive involvement of the West and Washington. Secondly, President Xi Jinping’s urgency to tighten his grip and the contracting window period for him and the party to consolidate internal and external advantages while they can. Thirdly, the anticipation of the changing power parity and greater in-depth totality of the potential return of Donald Trump in the 2024 US presidential election, which will bolster America’s hard-hitting approach in squeezing Beijing and increasing the edge of Washington in defending Taiwan and preventing the larger domino effect of the region’s high stakes at play. – July 22, 2022.

* Collins Chong Yew Keat reads The Malaysian Insight.

* This is the opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insight. Article may be edited for brevity and clarity.